The Honorable Marsha J. Pechman 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 AUXIER FINANCIAL GROUP LLC, 10 No. C10-2070 MJP Plaintiff, 11 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' UNOPPOSED v. 12 MOTION FOR SUMMARY **JUDGMENT** 13 JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.; Bank of Note on Motion Calendar: America N.A. as Successor by Merger to 14 Friday, December 30, 2011 LASALLE BANK N.A. as TRUSTEE for Washington Mutual Mortgage Pass-through 15 Certificates WaMu Series 2007-OA4 Trust, and for Washington Mutual Mortgage Pass-Through 16 Certificates MWALT Series 2007 OC-1 Trust, 17 Defendants. 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 Defendants moved for summary judgment on December 8, 2011, noting the motion for 20 consideration on Friday, December 30, 2011. See Dkt. 22. The deadline for Plaintiff to file 21 opposition papers was Tuesday, December 27, 2011. Local Rule W.D. Wash. 7(d)(3); Fed. R. 22 Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C), 6(a)(6)(A). Plaintiff did not file opposition papers on December 27, 2011. 23 II. ARGUMENT 24 The Court should view Plaintiffs' failure to file papers in opposition as an admission 25 that the Motion has merit and should therefore grant Defendants' motion and enter summary 26 judgment in Defendants' favor. See Local Rules W.D. Wash. 7(b)(2); Yarcho v. City of 27

Issaquah, 2011 WL 806591, *1 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (Pechman, J.) (granting summary judgment as a result of non-opposition pursuant to Local Rule W.D. Wash. 7(b)(2)). Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d. 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs"); Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 614-15 (7th Cir. 2005) ("our judges are busy people" and "given plausible reasons for dismissing a complaint, they are not going to do the plaintiff's research and try to discover whether there might be something to say against the defendants' reasoning").

Moreover, because the motion was one for summary judgment, Plaintiff could not rest on the allegations of its Complaint. "[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving party has shown the absence of a disputed issue of fact, it is entitled to summary judgment if the non-moving party fails to present, by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file, "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." *Id.* at 324. In fact, "the moving party may simply point to the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." *In re Brazier Forest Prod. Inc.*, 921 F.2d 221, 223 (9th Cir. 1990). The non-movant may not rest on the allegations of the pleadings, but *must produce specific facts showing a genuine issue*. *Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc.*, 793 F.2d 1100, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1986).

Regardless, the Court should grant Defendants' motion for two separate reasons:

First, Plaintiff has no interest in the property at issue in this lawsuit and thus lacks standing to bring these claims at all. *See* Def. Mot. [Dkt. 22] at pp. 6-14. The owners of the property are the parties to the Deed of Trust (Joe Sellars and Greg Greene), who have owned the property since 2007, and who both agree that Plaintiff has no interest in the property. *Id.*

Second, Plaintiff's claims fail either as a matter of law or because Plaintiff has no evidence to support the essential elements of its claims. *See id.* pp. 14-24. Because Chase has

held the underlying Note (endorsed in blank) during all relevant time periods (as the agent for the relevant Trust), it has been the holder with the right to foreclose, making the earlier assignment raised by Plaintiff a harmless error that has in no way prejudiced anyone (let alone Plaintiff, a stranger to the Note and Deed of Trust). *Id.* at pp. 15-17. Likewise, Plaintiff cannot bring a claim for wrongful foreclosure, as Washington does not recognize a cause of action for the wrongful initiation of foreclosure. *Id.* at pp. 17-18. Similarly, Plaintiff has no evidence supporting a slander of title claim. *Id.* at 18-19. Finally, Plaintiff has no evidence supporting the elements of its CPA claim, *id.* at 19-22, nor can it offer evidence justifying an award of injunctive or declaratory relief. *Id.* at 22-24.

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff lacks standing to bring claims against Defendants because Plaintiff does not have *any* ownership or possessory interest in the Property. But even if Plaintiff had standing, it has no evidence supporting the essential elements of its claims. Plaintiff's claims thus fail and the Court should enter summary judgment in favor of Defendants.

DATED this 28th day of December, 2011.

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CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE

I hereby certify that on December 28, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following:

• Edward L. Mueller elm@muellerlawfirm.net

DATED this 28th day of December, 2011.

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